

9.1.8 Doc 1532 - Item 40

Encl. 10. 10

時 平陽	通達第 42026 號	年 月 日 時 分	主管 重米利加局長	電話課長
第七三六號 (元古符龍總府極秘)	件名 日本交渉	宛 在米利加大使	主件 重米利加局長	附件
				元古符龍總府極秘 永十一年一月二日起算
記承所	宛 外務大臣			

本交渉ハ諸般關係上、一月二三日迄ニ調印ヲ完
了スル必要ニ處テ、王難ヲ免ルル如キニ因テ、狀勢上
絶對ニ致方ナク、我ニ付石竹寺、續テ、日本國文、破綻ヲ
致ス。大漢意ヲ以テ、元今、御方力ヲ以テ、之ヲ總願ス
而シテ、貴大使限リ、御令ニ至

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Item 40

Exhibit No. _____

Supervisor: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau
Section Chief: Chief of the 1st Section, American Affairs Bureau
Drafted: 5 Nov. 1941
Telegram: Despetch No. 42026
To: Ambassador NOMURA in the U.S.A.
From: /Foreign/ Minister TOGO
Subject: Japanese American Negotiations
726 (in cipher Code of Office Read.
of utmost secrecy)

As to the present negotiations, it is necessary that the signing should be completed by the 25th of this month at the latest, because of various circumstances. Although this would seem to be compelling you to accomplish a matter of utmost difficulty, it is absolutely unavoidable under all the circumstances. Therefore, we beg of you to understand the above thoroughly and with the great resolution of saving the Japanese American negotiations from failure, to exert yourself to the utmost.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

大臣
次長
秘書

暗	電送第428B-42875号 昭和十六年四月十二日 前/如吟院	管 亞米利加局長 山本
件名 （英米交渉ノ公談）	宛 野村大使	到 亞米利加局長 昭和十六年四月十二日 起卓
（館長符子）	宛 東郷大臣	

一、十一日（日）用ヲ以、才訪ノ際、在、英、米、大使、過、日、
貴、大、臣、（山本）氏、ニ、三、三、三、ニ、本、國、政、府、ニ、報、
告、セ、ル、事、（府、外、省、）
細、テ、承、知、ス、ル、事、
望、ス、ル、事、
先、以、テ、成、サ、レ、ハ、
開、話、合、ハ、本、國、政、府、ニ、米、米、差、支、ナ、レ、ト、考、ヘ、居、リ、
尤、米、現、案、（米、米、）
府、ト、協、議、
ニ、共、通、
越、セ、リ、
ニ、依、テ、本、ハ、日、本、交、渉、中、ニ、英、國、ニ、重、大、利、害、関、
係、アル、事、
ニ、英、國、
調、印、

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25 m 22

IPS

Doc

No. 153

24 3rd 1944

右欄所引大イナミと署名イナミと連ハタル又同に連
日米交渉、通商、並ニ此等ノ條件ノ締結ノ希望、故
チイナミ、一ノ點、陸上ニハ食ハタルニ付本大臣
ハ過吉ニ答フ、然レモ因該社ノ交渉ハ本國ノ利益ニ
本國ノ利益ニ付、一ノ點、一ノ點、一ノ點、一ノ點、
對米市場ノ保護、一ノ點、一ノ點、一ノ點、一ノ點、
右ノ交渉、並ニ此等ノ條件ノ締結ノ希望、故
日米交渉、通商、並ニ此等ノ條件ノ締結ノ希望、故

「六」六頁

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最大限讓歩ヲ散ラシタル最後案ヲ提示セル次第ニテ米側
 ニモ多分此上ノ反對ナカルヘシト思ヒ居ル処米國政府ウ右ヲ
 受諾セハ一週間乃至十日以内ニモ調印可能ナルヘク又不幸ニ
 之ヲ拒ムセハ交渉繼續ノ可能性ナキ認合ナリ 我國内
 情勢ハ此上ノ遷延ヲ絕對ニ許サス 本大臣ハ日英日米
 關係ノ危局ヲ回避スル爲 目下畢生ノ努力ヲ傾注シ居ルモノ
 ニテ國內一部ニハ交渉無用論サヘアリシニ拘ラス之ヲ制シテ
 交渉繼續ニ決定セシムル繼續アリ從フテ此上交渉ヲ遷
 延セシムルコトハ不可能ニテ且無意味ノ結果トナルヘシ 英米
 ノ態度如何ニ依リテハ迅速妥結ノ方法モアル次第ナルハ貴國
 政府ニ於テモ此辺ノ事情ヲ充分ニ考量シ交渉急速成立ニ盡力
 アリ度シト述ベテ事態多心迫セル所以ヲ縷述シタル同大使ハ右傾
 聴シ初メテ才態眞逼迫セルヲ痛感セルモノ如ク右ヲ早速政
 府ニ電報スヘノ自分モ局面打開ノ爲最善ノ努力ヲ試ミルヘシト
 述ヘ辭去セリ

三右ノ如ク米國政府ハ今猶英國政府ニ對シ今次交渉ハ未タ
 予備的意見交換ヲ試ミ出テサルモノナルヤニ説明シ居ルモノト認
 メラルル処右ハ(貴電第一〇七〇号)ローズベルト大統領ノ言
 (本件予備的會談力交渉基礎タルキ良好ノ結果ヲ擧ゲテシト
 ヲ希望ス云々)ニ徴スルモ明白ニシテ交渉既ニ最後の段階ニ至リ
 逐日緊迫ヲ加ヘソワアル現在米國政府力依然トシテ斯ル長
 緩慢ナル態度ヲ持スルハ三方トシテ頗ル意外且遺憾スル所ナ
 リ就テハ貴大使ハ屢次訓令ノ趣ヒテ更ニ米側ヲ啓蒙シ其
 猛省ヲ促シ速ニ本件交渉ニ意ヲ決セシムル様御奮闘アラント
 ヲ切望ス

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Exh. No. _____

Superintendent: American Bureau Chief Sgt. YAMAMOTO

Official in charge: Chief of 1st Section, American Bureau SHUN

Drafted on 11 Nov. 1941

Electrical Transmission No. 42873-42875

Sent at 1: A.M., 12 Nov. 1941

To: Ambassador NOMURA in the United States of America

From: Minister TOGO

Subject: Japanese-American Negotiations

(A conversation with the British Ambassador)

(Code) Very Urgent No. 764 (Diplomatic Agency Code)

(T.N. on the margin) Minister	Signed	Telegraph Section Chief
Vice-Minister	Signed	(KAMEYAMA)

1. The British Ambassador in Tokyo called on the 11th on some other business stated that he had reported the words of Your Excellency the Minister (sic) /TN. Ambassador's?/ (previous telegram No. 732-2) to his home Government, to which his government sent word to the following effect: - "The British Government knows no details of the conversations carried on in Washington, but eagerly desires for the success in them as it will be advantageous to Japan and Great Britain.

Unless some or other bases of discussion, however, for the establishment of principles are formulated first, it is regarded as unnecessary to enter into further negotiations. It is of an opinion that the intervening consultation can be left to the U. S. Government. When actual negotiations are possible, however, the U.S. Government is by arrangement to confer with the British Government; so in that case it will be glad to cooperate with Japan and the United States for the settlement of common problems."

2. Then, I, the Minister, stated: - "As the Japanese-American negotiations contain matters of great interest to Great Britain it will be necessary for Japan and Great Britain to arrive at an agreement and sign it simultaneously when an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, and I have desired the U.S. Government to make such arrangements." The said Ambassador replied that he did not know the real state of the Japanese-American

negotiations, but that he understood that they were still in the stage of preparatory conversations. I, the Minister, said: - "Whatever may be the case in the past, the negotiations have now become formal negotiations in the very light of their substance. They have already entered into the final stage with the submission of the final counter-proposal of the Imperial Government. To this effect, I made a statement to the U. S. the other day. The British Premier, in his speech at the luncheon given by the Lord Mayor of London, said that he was going to send a warning to Japan though he was not well acquainted with the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations. But would it not be more appropriate for Great Britain to know all the details of such important negotiations and to cooperate in them than to issue a warning? I have no intention of making any special proposal as to Great Britain's participation in the Japanese-American negotiations in the present stage, there being / certain/ relations between Great Britain and the United States. The Imperial Government has daringly submitted its last proposal with greatest concessions for the sake of a rapid conclusion of the negotiations, and so it is thought that there will be no further objection by U.S.; if the U.S. Government accepts it, it can be signed within a week or ten days; and if, unfortunately, it is rejected, there will be no possibility of continuing the negotiations. Our domestic situation positively admits of no further delay of the negotiations. I, the Minister, am now doing my utmost to avoid the crisis between Japan and Great Britain and between Japan and the United States. In certain quarters in the country the uselessness of the negotiations was insisted upon, but this was suppressed and caused the continuation of the negotiations to be decided upon; in view of the said circumstances it will be impossible and end in a meaningless result to delay the negotiations any further. As a quick conclusion is possible depending upon the attitudes of Great Britain and the United States, I desire the British Government to take those circumstances into consideration and to make efforts for quick conclusion of the negotiations."

When I thus dwelt upon the urgency of the situation, the said Ambassador, after listening, seemed to be deeply impressed for the first time by the real urgency of the situation, said that he would despatch a report to his Government to that effect and do his best to save the situation.

3. As mentioned above, it is understood that the U. S. Government is describing to the British Government that the present negotiations to be supposedly still on the stage of preparatory exchange of opinions, and this is clarified in President Roosevelt's words (2-1 your telegram No. 1070) (It is desired that these preparatory conversations will have good results as a basis of negotiations, etc.) We are very surprised and regret

That the U. S. Government is assuming such an easy-going and slow attitude when the negotiations are now in the final stage and the situation is growing more and more urgent each day. It is earnestly desired that Your Excellency the Ambassador make efforts to further enlighten the U.S. in accordance with my frequent instructions and urge them to make serious reconsideration so as to induce them into deciding upon the conclusion of these negotiations. 2-2

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枢义

館長付託

野村人遺

東鄉 蔡大昌

将一九四

本國は實天區限ヲ御含ニ守世天日本交渉行
天必^(陰)_陽確信シ最後立奮斗取テ其共人事
ヲ無^陽_陰ニ天命ヲ待ツルに覺サリ然レ觀下ノ^陽_陰師勞ニ何
處ノ有^陽_陰ヲ觀測ス

人臣

本電 不記
以外 照面

一、既ニ果テ報告^ヲ、通リ米國政府、太平洋政策^ニ日本
土^ニハ、通、北通ヲ阻止^スニ在リ、而シテ經濟壓迫ヲ
以テ其目的ヲ達成^スニ在リ、通ニ對シテ戰爭^ニ對シテ經濟^ニ者
通^スヲ居^スリ

二、即今日之南進、北進、之場合、計、作戦、他、
万般準備、其、南、北、進、に、極力協力、米、国、信、
條、を、政治、的、根、本、原、則、ヲ、讓、リ、各、協、定、を、大、空、口、戰、
争、ヲ、許、ス、ル、覺、悟、ヲ、今、ノ、所、失、敗、下、ニ、刻、印、ヲ、押、
ス、教、育、ヲ、シ、テ、之、ヲ、全、設、ス、如、キ、ニ、シ、テ、又、其、思、
フ、ト、思、フ、ニ、殊、ニ、最、速、ニ、進、出、ス、ル、情、景、ヲ、
ト、シ、テ、蘇、聯、ノ、戰、意、ハ、今、猶、現、在、之、軍、備、調、和、ノ、危、
險、ヲ、誘、フ、キ、ス、ニ、反、テ、好、ク、シ、テ、今、日、層、次、ニ、モ、ア、ル、
ト、思、料、セ、ル、

此部十二子十(自十)百數後以而全
十(自十)百數後本者着

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三、支那の平和會議、興國關係より事情を陳
援、易ラ爲シ、平和安定、蓋支那主權回復
及ぶべき條件、承認を得、立憲に在リ、抑々此
ニ支那問題、太平洋安定、之を以テ、平和ナリ
甚、蓋、日本、日本國支調節、而不可能ナリ、得、次ナリ
四、把、軸關係、日本政府、吾同、次才ニ依リ、或、極、ナリ
緊、密、一付ナリ、或、ナリ、極、ナリ、能、重、性、ナリ
然、之、下、西、南、ニ、形、勢、如何、直、背、後、リ、米、國
ナリ、此、安、勢、在、ニ、モ、ト、認、メ、言、新、聞、漸、次
把、軸、ナリ、緊、密、化、意、シ、六、任、化、ヲ、認、心、第、書
五、我國、自存自活、萬、南、進、敢、行、志、合、ニ、以、意、
結、論、ナリ、米、南、國、戰、ナリ、自、蘇、聯、モ
参加、ス、ニ、三、五、心、皆、ナリ、又、中、立、國、中
ニ、中、米、諸、國、既、ニ、米、國、檢、査、中、立、ナリ、居
リ、南、米、諸、國、嫌、々、中、立、經濟、的、生、在、上、結、
六、此、戰、争、長、期、ナリ、必、然、ノ、勢、ニ、下、局、即
成、敗、ハ、左、程、大、問題、ニ、最、後、迄、張、リ、得
七、米、國、ハ、出、方、東、大、西洋、深、入、シ、カ、モ、該
方面、西、方、ニ、三、本、ハ、二、國、聯、作、戦、ニ、今、日、
形、勢、ニ、何、時、ニ、主、力、ヲ、太、平、洋、ニ、皆、中、ニ、得
ハ、米、國、モ、市、場、中、軍、現、狀、ニ、照、シ、可、成、

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/Marginal Remarks:/

Minister: O.K.

This telegram is not to be handed to anyone but the Minister. T.N.
written in red pencil./

#31948
(General: #34925)
#64947

Chief of the Telegraph Section: (KAMEYAMA) /seal/

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Despatched from Washington: P.M., Nov. 14, 1941.
(Secret)

Received by this Ministry: A.M., Nov. 15.

/TOP SECRET Cipher Code of Office Head/

/From:/ Ambassador NOMURA

/To:/ Foreign Minister TOGO

No. 1090

This telegram is for your Excellency's own information only.

As regards the Japanese-American negotiations, I will exert my efforts to the last with firm conviction that they will surely reach an agreement. After my efforts I will leave the rest to Providence --- this is my frame of mind. My observation of the current situation, however, is as follows:

1. As I have repeatedly informed you, the Pacific policy of the American Government is to check further advances by Japan either southward or northward; and though they /the American Government/ are attempting to achieve this objective through economic oppression, they are making steady preparations for war.
2. In other words, they are making operational and all other preparations in case Japan should make her southward or northward advance; they are co-operating with the nations concerned with utmost efforts, and rather than stretch their fundamental political principle in which they have believed and compromised, they would not hesitate to fight. It does not seem at present that they have any intention to repeat such as the Munich Conference held a few years ago and branded as a failure; this seems still more so, now that, considering that Germany has passed

the crest of her prosperity, they are pleased with the fact that the Soviet Union has still the will to fight and accordingly the fear of her making a separate peace has been diminished.

3. Their relations with China have been turning day by day to those of allied powers and they are giving assistance as far as circumstances may permit. And it seems that they are not in a position to acknowledge such conditions as will produce an unfavorable effect upon the sovereignty of China for the purpose of stabilizing the Pacific. Therefore, the China problem may prove to be a stumbling block in the way of the stabilization of the Pacific and due to this, the adjustment of Japanese-American relations may also become impossible.
4. The relations with the Axis powers are very flexible and it rests with the authorities of the Japanese Government whether they become very closely united into one body or otherwise. Nevertheless, they consider that in effect, /we/ are in a position to immediately attack America in the rear, if the situation required. The newspapers are gradually in a tone of writing of our closer relationship with the Axis, or, in some extreme cases, the unification with them.
5. Should our country venture a southward advance for the sake of self-existence and self-support, it naturally follows that there will be a war with Britain, America, and the Netherlands, and besides, I believe, chances are great for the Soviet Union's participating in it. Furthermore, among neutral nations, those in Central America have already been got under America's thumb; and as for those in South America, for their economic existence, they will after all, reluctantly maintain neutrality, which is advantageous to the American side.
6. It is inevitable that this war will extend over a long period, and local success or failure will matter little. It is not hard to see that whoever holds out to the last will be the victor.
7. Indeed, America seems to be going deeper and deeper into the Atlantic, but /what it does/ in that area is, in brief, merely an operation relating to 'convoys' and, as things stand now, it will be able to concentrate its main force to the Pacific at any moment. In the light of the current conditions of the German and the Italian Navy, Great Britain also must be able to despatch a considerable strength to the area of the Indian Ocean. Really I had expected that

should America be kept busy on the Atlantic, it would come to assume somewhat conciliatory attitude in the Pacific, but no such inclination is seen as yet. On the contrary, in the light of the fact that there are still some to oppose for war with Germany because of domestic problems, and that on the other hand, no opposition to the Pacific war is found at present in the public opinion, it is necessary to expect that it is quite probable for America to participate into war in this area.

8. I shall be open to the criticism of being reckless to suggest this, when I realize from your successive telegrams that the situation is pressing though I am not well informed on the state of the current domestic affairs, and when I am informed to the effect that the nation are on the point of exhausting their patience, it is my humble opinion, however, that we had better be patient till we can see a little more clearly through the whole situation of the world war, if the state of affairs in our country permits, rather than be particular about the speediness of a month or two.

Furthermore, I should like to ask you to read my telegram of the 3rd and the 4th of October, No. 894 and No. 901.

(The end)

Supervisor: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau
 Section Chief: Chief of the 1st Section, American Affairs Bureau
 Drafted: 15 Nov. 1941
 Telegram Sent: At 4:13 pm on 16 Nov. 1941
 From: Minister TOJO
 To: Ambassador NOBUA
 #781 (B) Very Urgent (Ambassador's code)
 Subject: Japanese-American Negotiations

1. I am in receipt of your telegram #1090. Your anxieties and efforts are greatly appreciated but since the fate of the nation will become tense within a week, further efforts on your part are urgently requested.
2. The import of the letter part of your telegram is quite understandable and we have given it due consideration and discussed it carefully before a decision was made on the fundamental national policy as per our telegram #725. However, I regret that it is impossible for us, due to various circumstances, to wait patiently until some idea can be formed as to the outlook of the world war, as you suggest. I hope you will realize that the necessity for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations by the date set in our telegram #726 absolutely cannot be changed. Accordingly, as there are very few days left, please do your best to urge them on and lead the negotiations toward conclusion, on the basis of the Japanese proposals, not letting the Americans go into many directions.

(Please handle this telegram with care)

Supervisor: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau
Section Chief: Chief of the 1st Section
Drafted: Nov. 22, 1941
Dispatched: November 22, 1941 - 1:10 p.m.
To: Ambassador NOMURA
From: /Foreign/Minister TOGO

Re: Japanese-American Negotiations

(Cipher Code Telegram) #812 (Cipher Code for Office Read)

To both Ambassadors

As you know, it is almost impossible to change the date set in the Outgoing Telegram #736. However, since you are working hard, and as the Imperial Government, without discarding the fixed policy, wishes to spare no efforts to save the situation by reasoning to the last and thereby prevent the breaking-up of the Japanese-American relations, we have decided though there has been difficulties beyond your conception, to wait until the 29th, if an understanding between Japan and the U.S.A. can be reached within the next 3 or 4 days and the signing can be completed by that date, as well as the exchange of official notes, etc., and through which a firm agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands be made and all procedures completed. The said date cannot absolutely be changed further and the situations thereafter will have to develop automatically. Please take the above circumstances into consideration and do your utmost for the completion of the negotiations.

This is strictly for the two Ambassadors alone.

Seen by: Minister
Vice Minister

Seen by: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau
Chief of the South Seas Affairs Bureau

(Gen. 36293) To: Foreign Minister TOGO

From: Ambassador YOSHIZAMA

Despatched: 25 November 1941 PM Hanoi

Received: 26 November 1941 AM Foreign Office

Secret Ambassador's Code

Telegram No. 118 (Secret)

From what we have heard from the military, it seems that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt a decision between peace and war will be made at the Imperial Conference /BYOGI/ to be held within a day or two. If the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall of course be successively launched in accordance with the plans which have already been laid down.

However, should the negotiations fail, our forces will probably advance within ten days since practically all preparations for the campaign are already nearing completion.

Under these circumstances, there shall have to be considerable alterations in the program for the various enterprises to be carried out in accordance with our previous policy. We shall have to establish organs and conduct negotiations in compliance with the campaign. And especially, the thing that we are most concerned about is whether it is the policy of the government or the Imperial Headquarters, in the event of war, to proceed with military operations maintaining the status quo of the French-Indo-China government, and not only is it essential that we be previously informed of the above, but we wish to make necessary preparations at an early date. Therefore, if you have any opinions on the development of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations and on the outlook of the aforementioned matter, please wire us your instructions as soon as possible.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance, but according to press reports, the United States in conferring with the representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands, and China in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are aware of the matters being discussed in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Moreover, by means of personnel commuting to and

from Tokyo, the military here are also aware of not only the substance of the Japanese instructions but also the particulars of the said negotiations.

We feel as if the Foreign Office organ alone have been left out and neglected. As you pointed out in your circular message No. 2353, the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Therefore, please make arrangements to advise us immediately on these points by means of cable or courier services.

(End)

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Slum 163

(總 36293)

次官

東郷 外務大臣

電信課長 (電)

昭和十六年十一月廿五日 前線河内宛

十一月廿六日 前線本省署 (暗) (機)

極 密 館長 信号

芳澤 大使

軍閥より承知之所ニ依ル米國ヨリ、因答ハ廿五日我々
ニ對スルニ總ニカ果シ然ルモノ一兩日内ニ愈々廢議御
決定トシ且戰勦カニ結着クハ二十トハ悉知日米交渉
成立スル場合ニ於テ、今後米ノ方針ニ基キ順以テ諸種ノ重要事
ニ對シテ又二十ト分論シカモ若シ交渉不調トハ場合ニ
最モ早ニ休作戰準備ニ終リ、進メツツニ次第ニ付
諸國ヨリ、中ニ進軍ヲ見ルモノトナリ、其場合從軍
ノ方針ニ從テ遂行スルニ事ナシ、又、モ大ニ不安
モ生ズルモノトナリ、作戰ニ即應ズル施設ヲ宜ク交渉ノ途
ニ上ルモノトシ、諸ニ意方トシ、取調心ヲ有シ、開戰場
合佛印政府ノ地位現在ノ儘トシ、軍事行動ヲ進メ
ツニ政府乃モ大本營ノ御方針ナリヤ豫メ承知ノ旨ヲ
要スルモノトス、又早ニ及ビ、必要ナル準備ヲシ、思直キ度
就テ、日米交渉ノ發展並ニ前記ノ見込ニ付御意見
モ、ハ至急御電示相成度、追テ而撥充確保ノ旨ニ
ハ申ス迄モナキニ下リ、新聞報ニ依リ、華府ニテ米ハ
英露國乃重支那國ト討議ヲナシ、日米交渉ノ
由、合ハ之ヲ諸政府ニ對シ、米國ノ立場又ハ日米

I.P.S. Doc. No. 1532

(Item 192)

電信課長 (魚山)		電報課長	
主任		主任	
45577	45576	昭和十六年十一月三日 起草	
電送第	昭和十六年十一月三十日 發給文號	宛在獨	大島大使
件名	記録件名	東郷大臣	
第八八六號 大島長極秘 (館長符子)			

別電

大臣
次官

極秘

要旨

EXHIBIT No.

一 日米交渉ハ、四月下旬ヨリ開始シ、半成有余ニ至リ、
 進展セラル、英同帝國政府ハ、終始一貫、我國象不動、
 基調タル三國條約ヲ堅持シ、日米國交調整モ思慮シ、
 全條約、範圍内ニ於テ、今後時期ニ、決シテ、毅然シテ能
 度ヲ以テ交渉、條約外期、目的又米國、冬戰
 帝制ニ、昭示シ、交渉ナリ

二 從テ、總閣内閣、聯電、通リ、吾中國、板威ト存立トヲ
 嚴ニ、擁護シ、公認ニ、基礎ニ、於テ、從來、交渉ヲ建
 續セラル、交渉、至リ、難矣、中ニ、撤兵問題(支那
 及佛印ヨリ、撤兵要望又)等ニ、固ニ、彼我見解、
 對立モナリタルモ、從來交渉、経緯ニ、徴ス、根本、
 難關、寧ロ、半側、於テ、國際關係處理、固ニ、其
 傳統の理念即、過般ノ、英米洋上会谈ニ、表ハル
 今樣、原則の理念ヲ、固執セル友ニ、在リ、要ニ、
 米側、真意、日獨停、改更ニ、於テ、新秩序建設

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(即三國條約、目的)ヲ否認せしむルニシテ、
國リ能ハシテ提携ニ限リ、日英友好關係、締結ハ困難ナリ
ト爲シ、此見地ヨリ、遂ハ恰ニ中立國、三國條約締結
ヲ要求スルカ、能ハスルヲ示ス。要するに、左ハ交渉最後、
段階ニ至リ、即最近數日間、折衝ニ依リ、愈明白ト
ナリ、以テ帝國ハ事茲ニ至リ、ハ此上、交渉繼續
ハ、殆ド無益ナリト認めサレニ至リ。
三、二十三日米國政府、提示セラルル米、前駐態度ヲ
更ニ明ニセラルニシテ、三國條約、南シテハ、兩國政府、
一、方カ第三國ト締結シ度、如何ニ協定主本協定、
根本目的、即太平洋平和、金鐵、平和關係ニ矛盾ナ
カカリ、鮮然セラルニサレハ、同意ス。云々トアリ
左ハ帝國、三國條約義務、辭退ヲ拘束スルヲ米國
カ不日、歐洲戰事ニ参入シ、聯合帝國ヲシテ艦伊
援助ヲ、若シテハ、シタラズニ、金國ニ出ルモノト、明瞭ニ
シテ、他、諸問題ハ、免ニ、米國ニラ、目ニミテ、未則提議
ハ、交渉、甚難トスルニ能ハス。認事ナリ、向米國政府ハ本案
提議ニ、先々、三國條約、(三)時、諸國ト協議ヲ重キ
文化、尊重ナリ、從テ、米國ハ、今、有諸國ト共ニ、中立國ヲ、能
伊ハ、英ニ、敵視スルモノト、上ニ、(案)報セシ

/Marginal Remarks:/

Minister: O.K.

Vice-Minister:

/TOP SECRET/

#45577

Chief, Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs: /signed, illegible/

Chief, of the Telegraphic Section: KANEYAMA /sealed/

_____X_____

Supervisor: YAMAMOTO /signed/

Drafted: November 28, 1941

Serial number of telegrams sent: #45576

Despatched: 3:30 p.m., Nov. 30, 1941

To: Ambassador OSFIMA in Germany

From: Minister TOGO

Cipher: No. 986 A; Very Urgent; Top Secret (Cipher code of Office Head)

Separate Telegram

1. The Japanese-American negotiations were commenced in the middle of April and they have been continued over a period of half a year. In the meanwhile, the Imperial Government from the beginning to end has consistently stuck to the Tripartite Pact, which forms the unshakable keynote of our national policy, has been trying to bring out an amicable settlement as to the adjustment of Japanese-American relations strictly within the limits of the pact, and thus has endeavored to check America from participating into war, which fact is the desired end of the pact, by making negotiations with a constant resolute attitude.
2. Accordingly, the present cabinet, as previously telegraphed, strictly defending the Empire's prestige and existence, has carried on the past negotiations on a just and equitable basis. An opposition in views of both sides on the withdrawal of troops (the withdrawal of troops from China and French Indo-China is demanded) and on other matters could be mentioned as one of the chief difficult points, but the

fundamental difficulty, judging from the circumstances of past negotiations, lies rather in American adherence to her traditional idea regarding the management of international relations, namely - the adherence to the same fundamental idea shown in the British-American Conference held on the Ocean sometime ago. In short, the ultimate purpose of America is to deny and check the establishment of a new order (namely, the objective of the Tripartite Pact) in Europe and Asia by Japan, Germany, and Italy. That the maintenance of friendly relation between Japan and America would be difficult so long as the Empire acts in concert with Germany and Italy, was the stand America took, and based on this point of view, she began to assume the attitude to demand the Empire to break away from the Tripartite Pact. The above fact became clearer at the final phase of the negotiations, that is to say, during the negotiations of the last few days. As things have come to this, the Empire cannot but acknowledge that the continuance of further negotiation will be almost useless.

3. The counter-proposition presented by the American Government on the 26th has made the above-mentioned attitude much clearer. As regards the Tripartite Pact, it says: "Both Governments will agree that no agreement which wither has concluded with any third power /or powers/ shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area," and so on. It is obvious that the above could be traced back to its attempt to withhold the Empire from supporting Germany and Italy when America participates into the European War some day, by confining the interpretation of the Empire's obligation under the Tripartite Pact. Putting aside the various other problems, from this paragraph alone I have judged that the American proposition cannot be made the basis of the negotiations. Furthermore, before the American Government presented this proposition, it had repeatedly consulted with Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, (China), etc. Therefore, it can be judged that together with those countries, America is now going to look upon the Empire as an enemy.

Superintendent: American Bureau Chief

Official in charge: 1st Section Chief, American Bureau (KASE)

Drafted on 1 Dec. 1941

Electrical Transmission No. 45682

Sent at 8:30 P.M., 1 Dec., 1941

To: Ambassador NOMURA in the United States

From: Minister TOJO

Subject: Japanese-American Negotiations

Code No. 865 (Diplomatic Agency Code) (Very secret)

/T.N. on the margin/ Minister (signature) Telegraph Section
Vice-Minister Chief (KAMEYAMA)
(Signature)

Re our preceding telegram No. 857

1. Though the date set by our preceding telegram No. 812 has passed and the situation is making more progress, yet with a view to taking precautions against unnecessarily increasing American misgivings we are giving the lead to the press and others saying that there is a wide gap between the claims of Japan and U.S.A., but that the negotiations are still going on. (The foregoing is only for Your Excellency's information.)
2. I shall refrain on this occasion from making the representations to the American Ambassador in Tokyo as mentioned at the end of your telegram No. 1124, and request you to make the representations at your end only.
3. A report says that the hasty return of the President to Washington may have been influenced by Premier TOJO's declaration of the 30th, but I have a feeling that it may have been because of his anxiety about the urgent situation in the Far East. I request you to investigate the actual facts.

IPS. DOC. NO. 1532 - Item 216

Ex. No. _____

Vice Minister

Chief of the American Affairs Bureau

Chief of Telegraph Section (KAMEYAMA)

(Gen. 37537)

TO: Foreign Minister TOGO

FROM: Ambassador NOMURA

Dispatched: 3 Dec. 1941 PM, Washington

Received: 4 Dec. 1941 PM Foreign Office (Secret - Ambassador Code)

Telegram No. 1256

(RUMORS REGARDING THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE JAPANESE
STATIONARY TROOPS IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA)

Regarding your telegram No. 875

I received your reply immediately. I presume that this reply was, of course, carefully considered by the Cabinet Council (PYOKI?) However, as you have stated in your telegram, the United States is attaching a great deal of importance to this reply. Especially, since the President issued his statement yesterday, the press circle is frequently reporting that the reply to this matter under consideration is the key deciding war and peace between Japan and the United States.

There is no saying that the United States Government might not take a bold step, depending upon our reply. And, if our Imperial Government really anticipates the conclusion of the negotiations, or even in case your intention is to simply keep the negotiations going, I am afraid it would be difficult to convince the U.S.A. or prevent her from taking the bold step referred to with the explanation you have sent me. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. I, therefore, ask you to reconsider this question if possible with this in mind and wire me at once. (The end)

Minister

Vice Minister

Chief of the Telegram Sec. (KAMEYAMA)
Chief of the American Affairs Bureau (YAMAMOTO)
Chief of 1st Sec. American Affairs Bureau (KASE)

Drafted: Dec. 7, 1941

Despatched on Dec. 7, 1941, 5:30 P.M.

To: Ambassador NOMURA in the U.S.A.

From: /Foreign/ Minister TOGO

Subject: Japanese-American negotiations

(Presentation of Memorandum)

(Cipher) Very Urgent #007 (Ambassador's Code)

Re Outgoing telegram #001.

The Memorandum to the U.S.A. should be handed directly to the American Government (as far as possible, to the Secretary of State) by yourself at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th your time.

Doc. 1532 B

電候課長 (印)

(總36293)

昭和五年十月五日 後河内 發
上月廿六日 示 存 和

(概)

大臣
次官

ス

極秘 館長印

亞米利加局長
南洋局長

芳沢大使

東亞外務大臣

第二八號 (極秘)

NO 1

軍制ヨリ承知スル所ニ依ルハ米國ヨリ、四國共廿五日我
ニ到來スル趣ナルカ果シテ然リトモハ一兩日内ニ愈々
廟議中決定、上知戰孰シ直統ニ制スヘキコトナル
ヘキ處日米交渉成立スル場合ニ於テハ從來、方針
ニ基キ順次循禮、事業第一着ヲ平スヘキコト勿論ナルカ
若シ交渉不調ナル場合ニハ最早大倭作戦準備
備ニ終了ニ近ツキツツアル次第ニ付茲ト同日、
中ニ進軍ヲ見ルコトナルヘク其、場合從來、方針
ニ從ヒ進件スヘキ事業第一着ヲ平スヘキコト勿論ナルカ
更ニ要スルコトナリ作戦ニ即應スル施設ヲ
至交渉ヲ遂クルコトナルヘク殊ニ當方トシ

Doc. 1532B

最モ関心ヲ有スルハ南戦、場合佛印政府、地位
 現在、儘トシテ軍事行動ヲ進メラルル政府乃皇大本
 營、御方針ナリヤ豫メ承知シ置テ西セラル、ミナ
 ラス早キニ及ビテ中要ナル準備ヲ爲シ置キ度ク就
 テハ日米交渉、發展並ニ前途ノ見通シニ付
 意見モアテ、至急電示相成度。
 追而機密確保ノ要アルハ申ス迄モ無キコトナラ
 新聞報ニ依リハ華府ニテ米ハ英濠蘭乃至
 支那側ト討議ヲ爲シ居、日米交渉、内容ハ
 之等諸政府、承知シタル所ナル、ミナラズ當地
 軍側モ我方御訓令ノ内容乃至ハ交渉ノ経
 緯モ東京ト、往復等、方法ニ依リ承知シ
 オリ独り外務機關、ミ取り裁サレ居ルヤ、觀
 ル次第ナルカ貴電各々第ニ三五三號ノ通、
 時局モ切迫シ既ル次第ニ付電信又ハ使者、
 往復等、方法ニヨリ至急見解等、決定付
 御重示ヲ得ル様致度シ(了)

Item 163

To: Foreign Minister TOGO
From: Ambassador YOSHIKAWA

Dispatched: 25 November 1941 P M HANOI
Received: 26 November 1941 A M Foreign Office
Secret Ambassador Code
Telegram No. 118 (Secret)

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt a decision between peace and war will be made at the Imperial Conference within the next day or two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have already been laid down.

However, should the negotiations fail, since practically all preparations for the campaign are nearing completion, our forces shall be able to advance within ten days.

Under these circumstances, there shall have to be some alteration in the program we have laid out for the various enterprises. We shall have to establish organs and conduct negotiations in compliance with the campaign. The thing that we are most concerned about is whether it is the policy of the government or the Imperial Headquarters, in the event of war, to proceed with military operations and at the same time maintain the status quo of the French Indo-China governmental set-up. It is not only essential that we be advised of this, but we wish to make necessary pre-arrangements as early as possible.

If you have any opinions as to the development of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations and as to the outlook of the aforementioned matter, please inform this office as soon as possible.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance but according to press reports, the United States conferred with the representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands, and China in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Moreover, by means of personnel commuting to and from Tokyo, the military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but the general development of the said negotiations.

We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of the picture and neglected. As you pointed out in your circular message No. 2353, the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Therefore, please make arrangements to advise us immediately on these points by means of cable or courier services. (End)

Doc 1532 Cont,

(總 33752)

電信課長 (機)

昭和十六年十一月五日 後 華府發
十一月六日 前 本省著

極 秘 館長符號

東御 外務大臣

野村 大使

大臣

次官 第一〇三六號

米利加局長

貴電第七二五號ニ関シ

甲乙兩案英譯文ハ勿論當方ニ於テモ早速
作成スベキモ同電 (五)ノ次第モアリ
貴方ニ於テ「ゲル」大使ニ手交
セラルベキ英譯文ト、間ニ用語
其、他、相違ヲ避クル爲貴方英譯
之出來次第至急御電報請フ

(了)

ex. home

(機)